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1  The paper is based on and summarizes a more extensive analysis found in five Maastricht Graduate 
School of Governance Working papers: the reference (de Neubourg en de Graaf, 2007a, de Neubourg and 
de Graaf, 2007b, de Neubourg, Hener and Roelen,, 2007, de Neubourg, Castonguay and Roelen, 2007, de 





The performance and design of targeted income support to the poor differ across the 
advanced countries analysed.  Yet in most European countries, social assistance can be 
seen as an instrument of last resort after all other components of the Social Protection 
system have contributed to lower inequality and reduced poverty levels.  The European 
Social Protection systems are effective and efficient, but reforms are needed as a response 
to changing socio-economic conditions.  Of special importance are the reforms with 
respect to the provision of incentives for beneficiaries to become more active on the 
labour market, for providers to operate to be more critical when handing our benefits by 
changing entitlement rights as well as the containing operational costs.  After all, it is the 
design and adjustment to local circumstances that matter when the role of social 










H53: Government expenditure and welfare programs; 
I38: Government policy, provision and effects of welfare programs; 
O15: Human resources; human development, income distribution; 
O52: Europe.  
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Social Safety Nets and Targeted Social Assistance: 




Social Protection (SP) systems in advanced market economies consist of many different 
components. The specific architecture of the SP systems differs from country to country 
(and sometimes from region/state to region/state).  The specific social programmes that 
form the SP system can be subdivided in contributory and non-contributory benefits. 
Contributory transfer systems, which include among others pension and unemployment 
insurance, limit benefit disbursement to the contributors to particular schemes. Non-
contributory programmes instead are financed out of general public revenue.  They 
include social assistance programmes like family allowance and transfers and are not 
necessarily limited to tax/premium-payers, but may be means-tested and targeted to the 
poor.  
 
The objective of this paper is to review and compare the performance of social assistance 
non-contributory income support programmes for the poor
2 within the context of the 
Social Protection (SP) systems in European and other advanced economies.  Most of the 
discussion is based on the experience in nine European countries (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom), augmented 
sometimes with examples and comparisons with the SP system in USA and other OECD 
countries. 
 
The distinction between contributory SP programmes and social assistance is technically 
difficult within the European context.  Nevertheless, European countries have very 
sophisticated Social Protection systems within which both contributory and non-
contributory benefits. In most of the European countries, social assistance therefore plays 
only a marginal role.  The performance and specific design of the social assistance 
programmes differ greatly and are heavily related to the institutional and local conditions.  
The latter implies that other countries that would like to learn from the European systems, 
should judge the role of social assistance as a part of a more encompassing overall SP 
system.  
 
The first section of the paper provides the background necessary for analysing the 
differences in the construction of the Welfare States in the various countries.  The 
discussion is focused on the role of various components of SP systems and illustrates the 
large international differences in their components and their role in alleviating poverty 
and reducing inequality.  The second section provides details on the characteristics of the 
social assistance (targeted income support to the poor) programmes in the nine European 
countries.  The third section discusses the differences in the performance of the social 
assistance systems in terms of coverage and participation, effectiveness towards reducing 
poverty and inequality, efficiency in delivering the benefits, and implementation issues.  
The fourth section reviews the recent debate towards reforms in the systems.  The 
concluding section draws lessons from the experiences of the European countries related 
                                                 
2   Note that social assistance non-contributory income support programs for the poor sometimes can be 
referred to as targeted income support to the poor, means tested social assistance and means tested social 
transfers, targeted social assistance or safety nets.  In this paper we use those terms as synonymous and 
interchangeable.  
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to the design and implementation of Social Protection systems aimed at fighting poverty 
and reducing inequality. 
 
1.  Social Protection systems and the role of targeted assistance to the poor 
 
Public spending on Social Protection in Europe is high 
 
As illustrated by Figure 1a, public spending on Social Protection (including health) is 
important in all countries under consideration, but international differences are large.  The 
European emphasis on the public provision of social protection can be clearly seen from 
the level of public social expenditure.  Continental Europe allocates more funds to Social 
Protection than the United States. 
 
The highest public social spending levels are found in Central and North European 
countries.  Sweden is heading the list with social expenditure of 50% of GDP, and most 
of the other Western European countries spend between 30 to 45 % of their GDP on 
social protection.  Nevertheless, the emphasis on different types of benefits varies greatly 
between the different countries.  The Italian system puts a great emphasis on old age 
benefits and survivor benefits, which leaves little resources to be spent on other types of 
benefits, particularly on unemployment benefits while the Italian unemployment rate is 
one of the highest in Western Europe.   
 
Figure 1a: Gross government expenditure on social programmes in 











































































Source: Own calculation based on OECD Social Expenditure Database Edition 2004. 
 
 
A more accurate measure of social spending is however net total social expenditure.  This 
indicator represents not only gross government social expenditure, but also incorporates 
indirect taxes, tax breaks as well as mandatory and private social expenditure.  Figure 1b 
gives an overview of both gross and net expenditure and indicates that differences in 
social spending solely based upon gross figures may in fact be a less realistic 
representation of actual social spending behaviour.  For example, including voluntary 
private expenditure net total social protection expenditure actually differs slightly among 
the United States, United Kingdom and Sweden.  
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Gross Public Soc Exp
Net publicly mandated
Soc Exp (a)
Net total Soc Exp (b)
 
Notes: 
a: Incorporates gross public expenditure, indirect taxes, tax breaks and mandatory private 
social expenditure. 
b: Net publicly mandated social expenditure plus voluntary private social expenditure 
corrected for certain tax breaks to avoid double counting. 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database Edition 2007. 
 
 
The Social Protection systems in Europe are almost equally financed by three types of 
contributions: employers’ social contributions, social contributions by the protected 
persons and general government contributions.  But on the national level these 
proportions vary considerably between the different countries.  Notably, around 65% of 
contribution comes from contributions from employers and protected persons in Belgium, 
Spain, France, the Netherlands and Germany.  On the other hand, taxes are the main 
source of financing Social Protection in United Kingdom and Sweden.  Finally, it appears 
that it is only in the Netherlands that protected persons contribute more than their 
employers.  This 10% difference is quite considerable since in all other countries, 
employers contribute almost twice as much as protected persons. 
 
The philosophy underpinning the northern European Social Protection system is known 
as the Life course framework (Figure 2).  Under this framework, there are Social 
Protection interventions tailored for every stage in life of individuals and families: from 
child allowances (typically universal) for families which children, to employment 
assistance during youth, to unemployment benefits during the active period and finally to 
pensions during old-age.  Social assistance programmes, in this framework, provide the 
net of last resort for low-income families who cannot support themselves or are not 
assisted by other social programmes.  
 
Figure 2 also indicates how for every stage a combination of elements plays together in 
order to provide protection that the individual may need during a certain stage in life.  
Age specific provisions are supplemented by general components for handicapped and 
long term ill/disabled.  It also indicates that the public provision of goods as education, 
health and employment protection all work together to reduce risks and to mitigate the  
4 
effects of unfortunate events and to guarantee sufficient investment in human capital; all 
these elements are important to prevent people to slide into poverty after a crisis or 
unfortunate event.  Over the life cycle of individuals the consumption of public goods as 
education and health, take the form of Social Protection benefits in kind.  
 
Figure 2:  Life course framework for Standard Europe 
Chris de Neubourg Maastricht 
University
Life course framework: the 
“Standard Europe”
UCA, age 0 - 16
EA, age 16 - 24
ILI; SA; CSP, age 24 – 60+
UP; CP+CSP; PP; SA
DA for people disabled from birth as well as for those who are permanently or temporarily disabled
Investment in human capital/educational system
Re-training, employment protection, 
minimum standards, wage
Health, disasters, family protection, care facilities all age groups and handicapped
 
Legend for Figure 2:  UCA = Universal Child Allowance     Source: de Neubourg, 2005 
   EA  =  Educational  Allowance 
   ILI  =  Income Loss Insurance 
   SA  =  means  tested  Social  Assistance 
   CSP  =  Contributory  Survivors  Pension 
   UP  =  Universal  Pension 
   CP  =  Contributory  Pension  (compulsory) 
   PP  =  Private  Pension 
   DA=  Disablement  Allowance 
 
Social protection spending, poverty and inequality 
 
Higher spending on Social Protection in Continental European economies is associated 
with less (relative) poverty and inequality (Figures 3 and 4)
3. 
 
The fact that the poorest Americans are worse off than the poorest Europeans is 
confirmed regardless of which poverty and inequality measure is taken as a basis.  It is 
clear that there is a large gap between the poverty rate in Europe and the poverty rate in 
                                                 
3   Figure 3 uses a relative poverty measure. Poverty is measured as the percentage of the population with an 
income below 50 percent of the median equivalent income in the country.  The use of absolute poverty line 
would reveal the same differences (see footnote 1 for details).  This is also confirmed by a recent study by 
the OECD (2005).  
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the United States, which is almost three times as large as the poverty rate in Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden according to studies by Eurostat and the OECD.  
The United Kingdom finds itself between the Northern European countries and the 







While the average American has a higher living standard than the average resident in the 
other countries, this does not hold for the entire spectrum of the income distribution.  
Despite the higher aggregate and average standard of living in the United States, people 
in the lower deciles of the income distribution are far worse off in US than poorer persons 
or households in Europe, if compared to the median income of their own country.  Even if 
compared with the median income in US, the poor in Europe are better off (except of 
United Kingdom). 
 
Furthermore, the levels and duration of poverty are higher in the United States and the 
United Kingdom than in Continental European countries: more people experience poverty 
and stay longer in poverty in US and UK. 
 
By age-group, the largest differences in relative poverty rates in US versus Europe are for 
children and for the working poor. Looking at child poverty rates, the same type of 
differences can be observed: in Sweden and Belgium less than 5 percent of the children 
lived in poor households in 1995; in France, the Netherlands and Germany it was around 
10 % or less; in Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States approximately one out 
of five (or more) children lived in poor households.  On the other hand, the older age  
6 























Source: Förster and Mira d’Ercole, 2005. 
group is doing particularly well.  Retired workers used to belong to the risk-groups in 
terms of poverty, but this has clearly changed over the years (France and Belgium still 
show high poverty risks for persons over 65 years of age).  Improvements in pension 
provisions and social sector coverage in general are responsible for the reduced poverty 
among elder residents in most countries
4.  
 
Poverty among working households is strongly associated with the number of earners in 
the family.  Among households with two working adults poverty is virtually non-existent, 
except in Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.  This and the relative high 
incidence of poverty among single worker families in the same countries (and still 
poverty rates well above zero for the same group in the other countries) point to a 
phenomenon known as working poor.  Looking at poverty rates for households where one 
or more of its members are employed shows a clear difference between Continental 
European countries and Anglo-Saxon countries.  The relative poverty rates for that group 
were 2,3 % for France, 2,4 % for Germany, 3,7 % for Sweden compared to 6,9 % in 



























Welfare States and social protection arrangements are, according to many – especially 
European scholars – not only designed to alleviate poverty but also to reduce inequality.  
The same division of countries as found in the poverty studies, appears in this context as 
well: Sweden together with the other Continental European countries, Belgium, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands show the least inequality (the lowest Gini-coefficient see 
                                                 
4  A detailed analysis can be found in the publications referred to in footnote 1.  De Neubourg and de Graaf, 
2007 ans well as Notten and de Neubourg, 2007, also give a detailed comparison of poverty rates in Europe 
and the USA using relative and absolute poverty estimates.  
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Figure 4); Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States have the highest income 
inequality. 
 
Social Protection systems play a crucial role in reducing poverty and inequality 
 
The impact of Social Protection systems in reducing poverty and inequality is large.   
Many studies have illustrated this by comparing (simulated) poverty and inequality levels 
before taxes and transfers, with post tax-and-transfer levels.  While the Continental 
European countries show internationally the highest income inequality before taxes and 
benefits
5, they display smaller inequalities after taxes and benefits.  The interventionist 
and universalistic oriented Social Protection systems play an important role in this 
“correction”.  They also produce considerable lower poverty rates than other countries.  
Moreover, Social Protection systems in Continental Europe are more effective in the 
sense that they manage to reduce the duration of poverty and the incidence of poverty 
over the life-cycle of individuals and households.  The impact of social transfers on 
poverty rates is estimated in table 1 providing estimates of the relative (Laeken) poverty 
level (60 % of median income) and the absolute (Orshanski) poverty level (for details see 
Notten and de Neubourg, 2007). 
 
Table 1:  Poverty incidence using income excluding social benefits in 2000 
  Relative poverty (Laeken): 60 % of 
median income 
Absolute poverty (Orshansky) (net 
household income) 




























          
Belgium  36.8  22.4  13.3 28.6 10.9  3.6 
Denmark  30.3  20.6  10.8 25.5 11.7  3.4 
Germany  37.9  20.7  11.1 30.7 12.4  5.1 
Greece  38.9  22.7  20.5 42.8 27.8 26.1 
Spain    36.4  23.3  18.8 35.8 23.2 19.1 
France  41.0  24.4  15.4 33.3 15.2  6.5 
Ireland  35.2  29.5  21.4 26.1 19.5 10.6 
Italy  41.4  21.9  19.3 38.1 19.2 16.7 
Luxembourg 40.3  23.1  12.5 22.2 6.9  0.6 
Netherlands  35.0  20.4  11.3 29.7 15.0  6.6 
Austria  37.7  21.8  11.9 27.0 11.0  4.8 
Portugal  36.4  24.4  20.1 47.3 37.5 32.2 
Finland  39.1  28.2  11.4 30.2 17.3  4.9 
Sweden na  na  10.4  na  Na  5.7 
United  Kingdom  38.5  27.6  17.1 32.0 18.7  9.3 
United States  32.5  24.4  23.4  18.7  9.9  8.7 
1 The threshold (poverty line) is calculated on the basis of the income distribution after transfers.   
2 Thus, pensions are included in income but other social transfers are not. 
 
3 Not available or not yet calculated. 
4 ECHP total household income data for France and Finland are available in gross amounts only. 
 
                                                 
5  This is actually also due to the fact that the household surveys in the USA do not record household 
incomes above a certain level while European countries do not truncate the observation in this way.  
8 
The impact of Social Protection systems is even more pronounced for children. While 
more than one out of five children in the United States lives in poor households, this is 
only the case for less than 4 percent of the children in Belgium and Sweden (data 2000, 
details see de Neubourg and de Graaf, 2007a).  Undoubtedly, Social Protection systems 
have a large impact in reducing poverty in Continental European countries (they cover 
more people and provide higher transfers).  This success is associated with the provision 




























Another interesting finding while looking at poverty rates is that the number of long term 
poor BEFORE transfers and taxes is LOWER in the United States than in any European 
country with the United Kingdom and surprisingly Sweden having the HIGHEST poverty 
rates.  The same applies for the occasionally poor (at least once in the five ear period).  
Looking from this perspective, the UK Social Protection system delivers good results as 
does the Swedish system since their poverty rate AFTER transfers and taxes are amongst 
the lowest.  Indeed, comparing poverty rates before taxes and transfers to poverty rates 
after taxes and transfers, it is clear that direct taxes and social transfers contribute a lot to 
the alleviation of poverty in all countries, but in the United States less than in others. 
 
Furthermore, taxes and transfers played a significant role in containing the growing 
inequality in all the countries due to growing differences in market earnings.  The fact 
that inequality increased a lot more than poverty rates indicates that the importance of the 
taxes and government transfers has increased over the period from the early 80’s to the 
mid-90’s.  A strong evidence for this is a simulation showing that when all transfer 
incomes increase by the same percentage as other incomes, poverty in Europe is reduced 
Figure 5: Mean Social Transfers as a % of mean pre-tax 






















All households Mean total social
transfers, including retirement benefits
and unemployment compensation
All households Mean social retirement
benefits
All households Mean unemployment
compensation
2+2persons households Mean total
social transfers, including retirement
benefits and unemployment
compensation




Source: Compiled from Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; data for 1995.  
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to 10.1 percent in 2005 and to 7.9 percent in 2010 (See de Neubourg and de Graaf, 
2007a).  When, however, transfer incomes would be frozen on their 1995 level, poverty 
rates would be respectively 14.6 and 13.6 percent (1995 poverty level is 17.2 percent).  
The biggest effect would be felt by the aged persons, but poverty incidence would 
increase considerably for children as well.  This illustrates how even small adjustments in 
benefits (not indexing benefits to the growth of other incomes) change the (relative) 
poverty count.  
 
Within Social Protection systems, targeted social assistance plays a modest role  
 
Social Protection systems consist of many different types of benefits.  The European 
systems are big and include contributory benefits and non-contributory benefits. 
Contributory benefits are mostly associated with risks directly linked to labour market 
events (unemployment, retirement, professional illness and accidents, etc).  Non-
contributory benefits contain a large range of arrangements of which social assistance is 
only one (such as universal child benefits and social pensions).  Table 2 summarises the 
availability of non-contributory benefits in a selection of OECD countries
6. 
 
Figure 6: expenditure on social benefits as %  of total 













































































































Source: Eurostat-ESSPROS (2006) 
 
                                                 
6   We will argue in the final section that it is interesting to relax our assumptions on which arrangements 
can be contributory.  
10 
Table 2:  Non-contributory social transfer programmes 
Universal Means tested Non-parental 
care
Parental care
A u s t r a l i a YY–YYYYY
A u s t r i a Y G M I Y––––Y
Belgium Y – Y – – Y Y –
C a n a d a Y G M I –YYYY–
Czech Republic Y Y – Y – – – Y
Denmark Y Y Y – FB – Y –
Finland Y Y Y – FB Y – Y
F r a n c e YYYYYYYY
Germany Y Y Y – T Y Y Y
G r e e c e –Y Y–––––
Hungary Y Y Y – FB – – Y
I c e l a n d YYYYY– – –
Ireland Y GMI Y – Y Y – Y
I t a l y –Y–Y––––
J a p a n Y G M I –YYY– –
Korea Y GMI – – Y – Y –
Luxembourg Y GMI Y – T – Y Y
Netherlands Y Y Y – T Y Y –
New Zealand – Y – Y Y Y – –
N o r w a y YYY–Y–Y–
Poland Y Y – Y CCB – – Y
Portugal Y – – Y T – – –
Slovak Republic Y Y Y Y – – – Y
Spain Y – – Y T – – –
Sweden Y Y Y – Y – – –
S w i t z e r l a n d Y G M I Y–––––
United Kingdom Y Y Y – – Y Y –
United States – Y – Y – Y Y –
Family benefits Childcare benefits Guranteed 
Minimum 
Income






Notes:  “Y” indicates that the specific benefit or tax credit exists in this country. Where no specific housing or lone-parent benefit is available, “GMI” 
(guaranteed minimum income), “FB” (family benefit) or “CCB” (childcare benefit) indicate that housing or lone-parent specific provisions exist as part 
of these schemes. “T” indicates different tax provisions or specific tax allowances for lone parents where no other benefits are available. 
Source:  OECD (2004) Benefits and Wages  
11 
Within the SP system, social assistance programmes play a residual role in Continental 
Europe, because other types of benefits are available.  Moreover, universal health care and 
free education (including higher level education) also contribute to an effective social safety 
net BEFORE means targeted social assistance comes in. 
 
Within the Social Protection system, non-contributory social assistance plays a small, residual 
role in European Union countries, except for United Kingdom.  Figures 1 and 6 show for the 
European countries that about 0,5% of GDP is spent on “other contingencies” and about 1.5% 
of total social spending is meant for “Social exclusion not elsewhere classified”. 
 
Sickness and invalidity benefits have a great impact in the Netherlands and family benefits are 
important in Belgium, France and the UK.  In Italy, low spending on unemployment benefits 
is noticed in the impact it has on poverty rates.  Other benefits (including Social Assistance) 
are important in the UK particularly, and also in France and the Netherlands (in Germany the 
figure includes too many different benefits to draw conclusions).  It is striking to repeat that 
universal benefits such as public pensions and family allowances are important in poverty 
alleviation.  The resources allocated to these types of benefits are quantitatively more 
responsible for the success in poverty reduction programmes in Continental European 
countries that means tested targeted assistance (see also Figure 1). 
 
Many social benefits are universal in Europe, such as Child benefits and Old Age benefits.  
This does imply that the scope of the European Social Protection system is very high, since a 
large part of the population is eligible for many of the social benefits.  About 95% of the 
benefits in Continental Europe do not have a means-test, so that only categorical criteria such 
as age or degree of disability are determining eligibility. 
 
Moreover, Continental European Social Protection systems are generous systems in which 
benefit levels
7 are high compared to the United Kingdom and the United States.  Mean social 
transfers are around 40% of mean pre-tax and transfer income for France and Sweden, but 
only 12% in the United States.  For four-person households with two children, Sweden shows 
much higher benefit levels than the other countries, which can be explained by the importance 
of family benefits. 
 
The coverage of the overall European Social Protection system is thus very high, particularly 
compared to the United States.  First, the proportion of the population covered by the Social 
Protection system is larger, because of the universalistic nature of many benefits.  Second, the 
high level of interventionism in Continental Europe also implies that benefits are more 
generous.  
 
Which countries are more successful in targeting their spending toward the poorest strata of 
the society? Figure 7 from Heady (2001) illustrates the proportion of total cash transfers 
(excluding pensions) as a proportion of the total income captured by each decile.  The 
steepness of the descent of each line indicates the amount of targeting of benefits towards the 
poor.  The United Kingdom, followed by Belgium, has the more targeted distribution of 
benefits as a percentage of decile income.  On the other hand, Italy has a very flat descent 
indicating a small difference between the deciles in terms of cash transfers as a proportion of 
                                                 
7   In certain cases this could be called replacement rates. However, it is technically not correct to indicate benefit 
levels with “replacement rates” since this implies that some income is replaced while that is not always the case. 
Child allowances for example do not “replace” any income at all.  
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total decile income.  Most other countries have very similar distributions and find themselves 





















The European social protection systems also have low administration costs.  In looking at the 
efficiency of a social protection system, an important question is whether its expenditure is 
efficiently spent, that is to say whether administration costs and other expenses are not taking 
over a significant part of the expenditure.  This is not the case for public social expenditure in 
Europe, where the administration costs for most countries are under 4% of total social 
expenditure.  In fact, the European Welfare State is doing well in terms of efficiency if we 
compare it to the private insurance sector, where administration costs are often much higher. 
 
However, a comparison of the costs (overall SP spending) required to achieve a given 
reduction in overall poverty, most studies reviewed in de Neubourg and de Graaf, 2007b, 
place Anglo-Saxon countries (US and UK) before the other countries in the European Union.  
US and UK systems tend to be more cost-efficient: the extensive use of means-tested 
programmes translated in a larger reduction in poverty per monetary unit spent.  The most 
efficient Social Protection system according to calculation presented in de Neubourg and de 
Graaf 2007a, is the system in the United Kingdom, followed by the systems in Belgium and, 
surprisingly, the United States.  This can partially be explained by the small size of the US 
Welfare State, where very limited inputs produce small effects wasting relatively few 
resources (as judged from the financial indicators). 
 
All in all it becomes easy to understand why targeted benefits are such a small proportion of 
the total social expenditures in Europe compared to other countries as illustrated in figure 8.  
 























Source: Heady et al. (2001).  
Figure 7:  Cash transfers as proportion of total decile income, 1994.  
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Figure 8: Means-tested benefits expenditure as a proportion 
of total security expenditure (2003)























Source: EU data: Eurostat-ESSPROS (2006) 
USA data: Gilbert (2002) 
 
While the role of social assistance programmes in reducing poverty and inequality is marginal 
in Europe due to their small size (as is illustrated in table 3), these programmes are very 
effective in weaving the safety net tightly for those who fall through the protective belt of the 
other social protection measures. The performance of social assistance schemes in Europe is 
discussed in section 3. 
 
2.  Targeted means tested social assistance systems by 5 dimensions 
 
Means-tested social assistance programmes take many forms even within Europe.  Describing 
the systems in detail is a tedious undertaking and easily leads to lists of details that leave the 
overall picture difficult to grasp.  The main features of the systems can be outlined using 5 
dimensions: 
•  Solidarity between family members 
•  Selectivity and targeting 
•  Institutional decision level 
•  Generosity 
•  Re-integration efforts. 
 
Each of these dimensions relate to a set of basic questions that policy makers have to address 
when designing a system of targeted income support for the poor.  
1) Solidarity between family members: 
•  Is the system based on solidarity between all the individual residents or does the 
collective solidarity only apply after the assumed solidarity between household- and/or 
family members is exhausted?  Example:the social assistance systems in Germany and  
14 
Table 3:  Poverty reduction impact of benefit categories in 2000 (benchmark: final income) 
  Laeken  Orshansky (net household income) 















                   
Belgium  -15.6 -4.7  -4.9  -0.1  -0.5  -16.9 -2.8  -4.8  -0.2  -0.3 
Denmark  -11.5 -2.2  -5.1  -0.3  -2.9  -14.2 -0.7  -4.3  -0.1  -2.1 
Germany  -18.2 -4.9  -4.1  -0.5  -0.5  -18.0 -3.4  -3.1  -0.6  -0.4 
Greece  -16.7 -0.8  -1.4  0.0  -0.1  -15.2 -0.4  -1.2  0.0  -0.1 
Spain    -12.7 -0.4  -4.0  0.0  -0.2  -12.3 -0.4  -3.6  0.0  -0.2 
France  -16.9 -3.6  -3.8  -0.2  -2.4  -17.5 -3.7  -3.0  -0.2  -2.4 
Ireland  -6.1 -2.8  -5.4  -0.2 -0.8  -7.0 -3.3  -4.1  -0.4 -0.8 
Italy  -19.4 -0.5  -2.0  0.0  -0.1  -18.5 -0.4  -1.9  0.0  -0.1 
Luxembourg  -16.6 -6.0  -4.1  -0.3  0.0  -14.3 -2.3  -2.2  -1.3  0.0 
Netherlands  -14.7 -3.4  -4.3  -1.4  -0.7  -14.2 -2.4  -3.8  -1.8  -0.4 
Austria  -15.6 -6.7  -2.9  0.0  -0.5  -15.2 -3.7  -2.2  0.0  -0.2 
Portugal  -11.1  -0.9 -2.5  -0.3  -0.2  -9.8  -1.6 -3.4  -0.5  -0.1 
Finland  -12.4 -5.6  -11.3  -0.5  -2.8  -12.3 -2.6  -6.4  -0.4  -1.4 
Sweden                  
United  Kingdom  -14.0 -4.3  -3.9    -3.8  -14.1 -3.9  -3.2    -3.9 
United States                     
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Italy require that family members assist each other; the income of family members is 
part of the means test; only if the family cannot help, the social assistance system steps 
in.  The contrary is true in Sweden; all individuals are seen as independent and 
individuals are entitled to receive a benefit independently from the means of family 
members. 
2)  Selectivity and targeting: 
•  Who is entitled to receive a benefit?  Everybody whose income is below a certain 
threshold or only well defined categories in the population; Example: is the benefit 
given to every individual household like in i.e. in all European countries or i.e. only to 
household heads with children; 
•  What is the income threshold?  How is it defined? And how is “income” (means) 
calculated? Example: are all household means taken into consideration for calculating 
the income (means) or are certain items excluded such as the house that one is living 
in; Sweden takes into consideration many income sources while other countries 
exclude more items; 
•  How is the budget of the programmes determined? Are the programmes designed as 
entitlements, or are they subject to quotas?  Example: does the law guarantee the 
payment to all the entitled persons like in all northern European countries or is the 
budget fixed leading to non-disbursement once the budget is spent like in some Italian 
cities (see also section 3 on the service rate); 
3)  Institutional decision level: 
•  Which level in the administration defines the level of the benefits? Is the entitlement 
defined as a right for the citizens?  How is the local level involved and what can be 
decided on the local (implementing) level? Example: in France the benefits are 
decided upon by the central administration; in most other European countries local 
authorities are responsible for setting the benefits; in the northern European countries 
the benefit formula is fixed by law; in the southern European countries local 
administrations have a lot more discretionary power; 
4)  Generosity: 
•  What is the level of the benefit?  What is taken into consideration when the level is 
defined? For how long is the benefit allocated? Example: benefit levels differ widely 
between countries (as seen in table 2) but in some countries, in Belgium i.e., relatively 
low benefit levels are compensated by large disbursement of in kind assistance. 
  The benefit levels of various countries and some other key design features of social 
assistance systems in the OECD economies is summarised in table 2. 
5) Re-integration: 
•  How does the system avoid welfare dependency?  Do the beneficiaries have duties? 
How does the system stimulate re-integration of the beneficiaries into the regular 
economy?  Example: Some arrangements, like for example in Sweden and in the 
Benelux, put a lot of effort in channelling the beneficiaries as quickly as possible to a 
job or a re-training programme; other systems are less active in that respect, like the 
southern European arrangements; all systems tend towards more activation (see 
section 4). 
 
It is possible to group the countries by three types of targeted social assistance arrangements
8; 
supportive, selective and inclusive.  
 
                                                 
8   Note that this typology is based on MEANS TARGETED SOCIAL ASSISTANCE ARRANGEMENTS 
ONLY. The typology can not be used to categorize the social protection systems as a whole.  
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Table 4:  Key design features of Social Assistance programmes 
Maximum amount % average productive 
wage 
Threshold  Features of means test   
Household 
head 







Belgium 23  8 4-10 N  Y  1  Family 
Denmark 31  31  10  N  Y  1   
Finland 16 11  9-12  N Y 1   
France 20  9  0-9  N  Y 1  Family/Housing 
Germany 11  9  5-10  N  Y  1  Family 
Netherlands   30  13    N    1  Family/Housing 
Norway   30  7  4-16  NG    1   
Sweden 16 11  7-12  NG    1   
Switzerland 22  12  6  NG    1   
              
Greece         
Italy 16  9  7-8  R  Y  1  
Portugal 20 20 10  N  Y  1  Family/Housing 
Spain 27  3  3  R    1  Family 
              
Ireland  31  25  R  1  Family/Housing 
UK 14  8  10  N  Y  1  Housing 
              
USA 5  4  4  N  Y  1  EITC 
              
Hungary 16      NG    1   
Poland 21     N   1   
Slowak Rep.  17  12  8  N    1   
Note: APW is the average wage of a blue-collar worker in manufacturing sector in each country. The 
income threshold can be determined nationally (N), under national guidelines (NG), or regionally (R). 
Source:   OECD (2004) Benefits and Wages 
 
 
Supportive arrangements have universally accessible benefits guaranteed as citizens’ rights 
at a relatively generous level with strong pressures and incentives for the recipients to re-
integrate into the labour market.  The northern-central European countries Belgium, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden belong to this group. Social assistance arrangements 
are residual because many other social protection arrangements are available and tenders 
social assistance as the component of last resort within the Social Protection system.  The 
Netherlands and Sweden provide the most generous benefits but both countries also have hard 
means testing procedures and strong activation pressures (to get off the role).  Germany has 
the most selective system since it defines its entitlements more in terms of categories and 
requires a high level of family solidarity before the social assistance arrangements steps in. 
France and Belgium have nationally unified benefits (at a lower level than the Netherlands 
and Sweden) but leave a lot of discretionary power to the local social worker to push the 
beneficiaries into the labour market and to negotiate other duties.  The duration of the benefits 
in all countries is defined by the actual need of the claimants. 
 
Selective arrangements require and assume a high level of intra-household and intra-family 
solidarity.  The level duration of benefits is often limited by regulation and benefits are not 
nationally guaranteed.  The local discretion in the system is not only high in its 
implementation but even in its design; financing is often entirely left to the regional or even 
local level leading to big differences within the countries.  The southern European countries 
Italy, Portugal and Spain belong to this group with Spain leaning most towards the northern 
European Arrangements. 
 
The United Kingdom is an example of an inclusive arrangement. In the heart of the Anglo-
Saxon tradition, the social assistance arrangements are an integral part of a Social Protection  
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system that is highly means tested in its entire design. A large part of the entire Social 
Protection system is targeted towards the poor by having means testing as its basic feature.  
 
3.  The performance of social assistance systems in Europe 
 
There is relatively little systematic information available on the performance of the mean-
tested programmes in the European Union, partly due to the residual character of the social 
assistance arrangements.  The information that is available can be summarised by answering 4 
main questions: 
A.  How well do the systems cover the vulnerable part of the population that they seek to 
protect (coverage)? 
B.  To what extent do these parts of the SP system reduce poverty and inequality and how 
well do they succeed in avoiding benefit dependency (effectiveness)? 
C.  How well do the social assistance systems contain the costs (efficiency)? 





A.  Coverage of means tested social assistance programmes in Europe 
 
Estimates of the population covered by means-tested social assistance programmes (universal 
family benefits excluded) are relatively old and incomplete.  The available evidence, however, 
supports four main conclusions: 
•  The percentage of the population receiving social assistance is small but rising; 
•  The number of persons receiving a SA benefits is much smaller than the number of 
“theoretically eligible” (considerable non-take up rate); 
•  We understand why the non-take up rate is considerable; 
•  Non-take up is a policy concern and can be addressed. 
 
The percentage of the population actually receiving targeted social assistance benefits is 
small, as the SA programmes are mainly patching the Social Safety Net (SSN), providing last-
resort assistance for low-income households that are still poor after all other SP programmes 
have worked or that are no longer assisted by other programmes (typically other programmes 
are more generous in terms of benefit level and share of population covered; e.g. 
unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance for able-bodied individuals, special 
benefits for people with disabilities).  However, the limited evidence available suggests that 
the percentage of beneficiaries is increasing during the last decade.  We do not know precisely 
why that happened but the inflow of low income immigrants and refugees, the fact that the 
other SP programmes became more restrictive over time (with the emphasis on activation in 
Europe – see also section 4), and the fact that people are shifted from one type of benefit to 
another (towards the less generous SA benefit), all play an important role.  Tables 3 and 4 
illustrate the low percentages of the population that receive social assistance benefits and the 
rise of that percentage during the nineties of the last century.  A detailed discussion of the 




                                                 
9  The answers to these questions should be provided by sound social assistance monitoring devices: de 
Neubourg, Hener and Roelen, 2007 provides details on the monitoring systems in several countries as such.  
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benefiting from SA 
Share of individuals 
in households who 
receive SA 
Year 1992  1999 
Belgium 3.6  2.5 
France 2.3  2.8 
Germany 5.2  2.2 
Italy 4.8   
The Netherlands  3.7  3.2 
Portugal    
 2.7   
Sweden 6.8  (1.1) 








Table 6:  The coverage of targeted social assistance programmes increased over time 
   Belgium  France  Germany 
The 
Netherlands  Portugal Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Proportion Social Assistance (percentage) 
1980 1,5  -  0,9  1,2    0,2  3,5 
1985 1,7  -  1,7  1,6    0,5  7,8 
1990 2,1  1,2  2,1  1,5    0,5  7,0 
1995 2,5  2,3  2,2  1,4  5,7  1,1  10,5 
1999 2,5  2,8  2,2  3,2      1,1  9,2 
Note:  Figures show the proportion of the population aged between 15 and retirement age 
Source:  Gassmann and Desczka (2003) and Farinha (2001) 
 
 
The number of persons actually receiving a SA benefit is much smaller than the number of 
“theoretically eligible” persons.  This means that the non-take up rate is considerable.   
Figures are only available for few countries and the studies are not fully comparable.  An 
overview of the empirical and theoretical research on take up of welfare benefits
10 undertaken 
by OECD (2003) provides some basic data and reveals mechanisms that are important in this 
respect.  The take up rate reflects both decisions of eligible individuals to apply for benefits 
and the accuracy of administrative decisions as to whether these individuals should get the 
benefit in question or not.  The estimates of the extent of take up of welfare benefits are based 
on a variety of approaches, and typically combine both administrative and survey data. 
Despite these methodological differences, and the very few OECD countries for which 
estimates are available, the available evidence suggests that low take-up of welfare benefits 
occurs both across countries and programmes.  Estimates of take up rates typically span a 
range of between 40% and 80% in the case of social assistance and housing programmes, and 
between 60% and 80% for unemployment compensation.  For some countries more detailed 
data is available and they teach us that in case of means tested social assistance programmes, 
this considerable non-take up rate is both less outspoken and less dramatic than actually 
suggested by the overall figures.  For Germany and the UK we know that non-take up is 
positively associated with age (the older the potential beneficiaries, the less likely that they 
                                                 
10   The extent to which people eligible for various types of benefits actually receive them.  
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will claim the benefits) and negatively associated with children (the more children the 
potential beneficiaries have, the more likely they will claim the benefit).  
 
For the UK it has been estimated that although the non-take up rate in terms of caseload 
(people) is estimated to be in the range of 14 to 5 percent (for non-pensioners), the non-take 
rate in terms of expenditures is far less and ranging between 9 and 2 percent.  This leads to 
two important findings.  First, this indicates that the persons that do not claim their benefit (or 
do not receive it from the administration) are those who would have a small amount of benefit 
anyway; most of those with considerable benefits in fact do claim and get them.  The second 
finding is related to administrative rules.  The more stringent and complicated the 
administrative rules are, the less likely potential beneficiaries will claim the benefit.  This is 
especially clear in the cases of Germany and Sweden. Both countries show a remarkable high 
non-take up rate. In Germany this is related to the fact that the social assistance administration 
is entitled to check the income/means position of the family of the claimants including 
parents, grandparents, children and grandchildren.  This may refrain many potential 
beneficiaries from applying for a benefit since they do not want to bother their families with 
their own financial trouble
11.  In Sweden, the social assistance administration is known for 
being stringent on all income sources of the claimants; this clearly refrains some of them from 
applying fearing scrutiny of all their income components including the hidden ones
12.  
 
The factors that contribute to low take up rate in all social programmes can be grouped in 
three elements: 
•  Design of the social programme; 
•  Application behaviour of the potential beneficiaries and 
•  Practise of the administration in allocating the benefits.  
Together these factors lead a group of persons through a filtering process from “needy” to 
eventually welfare recipient.  It is important to understand the nature of these filters. The 
filters are summarised in Figure 9.   
 
Around the starting level of this filtering process are all the individuals who are targeted by a 
social benefit.  Generally they find themselves under a certain level of income or qualify for 
other kinds of criteria, which define them as needy in terms of the part of the legislation under 
consideration (for example, number of months unemployed).  Nevertheless, these targeted 
individuals have already been filtered from a larger group of needy individuals; some of those 




The second level of the filter differentiates between all those who are targeted because of 
having an income below a certain threshold and/or other types of selection criteria, and those 
who can legally be eligible for the benefit.  This difference is reflected by the eligibility rate.  
                                                 
11  This does not imply that a potential claimant would ask the family members to assist.  This might leave the 
potential claimant poor or in financial distress. 
12  For a detailed discussion and for a study of the beneficiaries of targeted social assistance schemes, see de 
Neubourg, and Nelissen 2007. 
13  The social construction of coverage and poverty is an issue that is often overlooked and that needs to be 
considered at this point of the analysis.  Unavoidably, judgments are made on the population that is taken into 
account in order to estimate the number of needy or poor. Saraceno (2002) argues interestingly how coverage 
indicators and even the very concept of ‘poverty’ is subject to ‘social construction’, meaning that a society 
implicitly and explicitly defines who is regarded as ‘deserving’ and who is not.  Estimates of social protection 
coverage therefore reflect these views through the process of filtering, from level 0 containing all needy persons 
to level 1 which refers to the targeted needy persons.  
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For example, while most students have an income below the threshold for social assistance, 
they are, however, often legally excluded from receiving this benefit since other types of 
financial help is available to them
14.   
 
Not all those who will be legally eligible for a benefit will apply for this benefit.  Potential 
applying claimants face four factors that influence the decision whether or not to file an 
application for social benefits: 
•  The amount and the duration of the benefit  
•  Information costs, costs associated with the administrative process 
•  Uncertainties and delays in the administration handling the applications and finally  
•  Social and psychological costs, such as stigma. 
The lower the benefits and the higher the costs of claiming a certain benefit, the bigger are the 
difference between levels 2 and 3.   
 
Then, from those who apply for a benefit, a portion will be found ineligible to receive the 
benefit.  The importance of this level of the filter depends a lot on the strictness of the 
eligibility criteria of the first level and the discretionary power of the social worker or 
administrators attributing the benefit
15.  The inclusion rate therefore explains the difference 
between the applying claimants, level 3, and the accepted claimants, level 4. In addition, the 
difference between those who are legally eligible claimants (level 2) and those who are 
accepted claimant (level 4) is the participation rate. 
  
Finally, the last level in the filtering process refers to the service rate, since not all accepted 
claimants might become actual beneficiaries for cause of lack of financial resources. 
 
The filtering process can quantitatively be described by calculating 6 ratios (Figure 9): 
•  Recognition rate: needy / targeted needy: from the larger group of needy individuals, 
only a subset considered to be “deserving” poor are covered by the programme 
system; 
•  Eligibility rate: targeted needy / legally eligible claimants: from the group of deserving 
poor people may be excluded for specific legal reasons related to their status 
(refugees, immigrants during the first years of their stay in a country, the institutional 
population, students, etc.); 
•  Participation rate: accepted claimants / legally eligible claimants: from the group of 
legally eligible claimants the administration may exclude some persons because of 
administrative reasons (incomplete information, doubts, mistakes, etc.); 
•  Inclusion rate: accepted claimants / applying claimants; 
•  Service rate: actual beneficiaries / accepted claimants; 
•  Take-up rate: actual beneficiaries / legally eligible claimants. 
                                                 
14  In addition, the status of (illegal) immigrants e.g. is a highly debated issue in this context; as well as the 
internationally very large ‘institutional’ population in the United States is equally quantitatively important in this 
respect raising questions about the status of inmates and psychiatric patients.   
15  Note that this is a somewhat simplified presentation of reality.  In this scheme we assume that Applying 
claimants are a subset of the Legally eligible claimants and thus that the number of Applying claimants < the 
number of Legally eligible claimants.  This is not necessarily true since applications are theoretically also open 









Describing the coverage of existing social programmes using the framework depicted above 
requires specific data.  General purposes surveys, administrative records and specific surveys 
can all contribute to our understanding, but all suffer from certain drawbacks
16. 
 
While it may be tempting for policy makers to ignore significant non-take up rates (lead to 
lower costs), they are in fact an important policy concern for at least three reasons: 
•  Whatever the aim of a welfare programme, the fact that it only reaches a fraction of 
those that are supposed to benefit, reduces the chances that it will reach its goals. The 
programme is not effective. 
•  Low take up of welfare benefits relates to equity.  When the decision not to take-up a 
benefit is partly involuntary (i.e.  when individuals are simply unaware of being 
entitled, or feel stigmatized when receiving benefits), this will generate disparities of 
treatment between individuals who should ex ante be treated equally by the welfare 
system. 
•  Better understanding the determinants of take-up decisions by individual agents will 
allow anticipating more accurately the financial consequences of policy changes.  For 
example, welfare reforms that restrict the pool of individuals eligible for benefits may 
not lead to substantial savings if more of them decide to take up their benefits. 
 
There is also a good understanding of what governments and/or programme administrations 
can do to reduce the low take-up rate of SA benefits: 
•  Simplification of administrative procedures;  
•  Consideration of the interactions between different programmes; and  
•  Production of better empirical evidence and research. 
 
                                                 
16  See OECD, 2003. 
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Source:  Hernanz, Malherbert and Pellizzari (2004) 
 
 
B.  Which European social assistance programme has greater impact in reducing poverty? 
 
In the first section, we looked at the impact of the overall SP spending on reducing poverty 
and inequality.  This section raises the same question, this time focusing only on social 
assistance programmes. Looking at the impact of some broad categories as done in Figure 6, 
where social assistance is calculated as the residual (other benefits) it can easily be concluded 
that relative to other social protection benefits, the impact of social assistance programmes on 
reducing poverty is relatively small.  For most European countries pensions account for the 
largest poverty reduction, but the second place, between unemployment benefits, disability 
benefits and family allowances varies per country.  Social assistance (other benefits) is much 
less important for reducing poverty than the rest of the SP programmes.  This is less so for the 
UK and to a certain extent also for the Netherlands (see figure 10).  
 
In judging the importance of targeted social assistance in (continental) Europe, it is important 
to note that these programmes are a smaller component of a large SP system that includes 
several social benefits that are available to large parts of the population.  The success of the 
SP system as a whole and of the non-targeted assistance components, indicated by the 
coverage of the SP systems might cast a shadow on the role of social assistance programmes.  
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Figure 10 Proportional decline in aggregate poverty due to specific benefit 
using FGT index









Pensions Sickness and disability benefits
Family benefits Unemployment benefits
Other benefits
 
Source: Heady et al. (2001). Figures are simulated based on data for the year 1994.  
 
 
A more in depth analysis of the impact of social assistance programmes is possible using the 
data available for a limited set of countries:  France, Italy, Germany and UK.  For these four 
countries, Hölsch and Kraus (2004) compared existing poverty rates with counterfactual 
poverty rates, simulated in absence of these benefits.  Not surprisingly, the largest reduction 
in poverty is found in UK.  Table 5 indicates that the Social Assistance programme in the 
United Kingdom is very effective at reducing poverty rates compared to the other three 
countries.  
 
Table 7:  Percentage reduction of poverty due to social assistance (1994-1995) 
   Headcount ratio  PGR*  FGT2** Sen index 
France 3,50  15,85  24,62  15,23 
Italy 1,72  3,76  5,61  3,71 
Germany 7,40  23,63  32,75  21,88 
United Kingdom  28,99  57,67  66,00  52,45 
Source:  Hölsch and Kraus (2004) 
Notes: * PGR = Poverty Gap Ratio 
** FGT2 = Foster-Greer-Thorbecke Index (α =2) 
 
 
Table 6 gives similar estimates for the reduction in inequality: again it can be seen that United 




Table 8:  Contribution of unemployment compensation and means-tested benefits to 
income inequality [around 1995, head of household aged 25-59 (elasticities of the Gini 
coefficient of disposable income)] 
   Belgium  Germany  Netherlands  Sweden
United 
Kingdom  United States 
Unemployment 
compensation after taxes  -9,4 -2,7  -1,0  -9,3  -0,4  -0,6 
Means-tested benefits  -1,2  -5,2  -7,2  -9,9  -14,4  -5,2 
Source: Ferranini and Nelson (2002) 
 
 
These results, however, should be interpreted with caution when compared with the overall 
impact of SP. In the previous section it was concluded that the United Kingdom and the 
United States were found to perform relatively poorly in terms of overall poverty and income 
inequality levels.  Moreover and more importantly, in both these countries the impact of the 
entire social protection system on the levels of poverty and income inequality is very modest 
compared to other countries.  These results contrast with the analysis in this section that 
suggests that the United Kingdom and the United States are very effective in reducing poverty 
using means-tested targeted social assistance.  The latter is certainly true; when comparing the 
impact of means-tested targeted social assistance internationally, the UK and the USA stand 
out as performing very well.  
 
However, in the northern Continental European countries, means-tested targeted social 
assistance is but a much smaller fraction of the benefits and policies used to address poverty 
and income inequality.  In the latter countries other non-means-tested benefits are much more 
important both quantitatively (in terms of money spent and number of beneficiaries) as well 
as in it impact on poverty and income inequality.  Public pensions, family allowances and 
unemployment benefits are significantly more important in these countries than in the UK and 
the USA.  Social assistance is the policy instrument of last resort in northern Continental 
Europe.  For this reason, poverty and inequality in the northern European countries is reduced 
in first instance by other policy instruments than means-tested social transfers.  The hard 
pockets of poverty left over after all the other instruments have done their work, is left to be 
addressed by social assistance.  Not surprisingly, it is much harder to reduce that part of 
poverty by raising the standard of living of social assistance recipients.  As a example, this is 
also clearly illustrated in Table 6 where in Belgium ranks number one when the poverty 
reduction impact of  unemployment benefits are calculated but ranks number six when the 
impact of social assistance is estimated
17.  
 
The situation for the southern European Countries (Italy, Spain and Portugal) is different. In 
these cases, social assistance is not very important nor very effective, while also the other 
parts of the social protection systems are less developed compared to the northern European 
Countries; the Welfare State is less all encompassing and social assistance is not organized 
effectively according to the measure used here. 
 
An effective social assistance programme lifts a great number of people out of poverty and 
reduces the income gap between people below and the people on the poverty line to zero 
(reduces the poverty gap). In practice, in order to do that, after having defined the part of 
                                                 
17  In Belgium there is no duration limit to unemployment benefits, meaning that long-term unemployed who are 
legally entitled to receive an unemployment benefit will receive it until they find a job or leave the labour 
market.  
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poorest deciles in the population that is entitled to receive benefit, policy designers still have 
choices to make.  One option is to allocate the available resources to the very poorest part 
only and lift these households out of poverty; another option would be to spread the available 
resources over all the households below a certain threshold income (the poverty line). There 
are many options and combinations in between.  Under both options the headcount poverty 
rate and the poverty gap ratio will be most probably be reduced but at different rates.   
Theoretically it is even possible that the second option would leave the headcount poverty 
unchanged despite the reallocation of resources (meaning that there would be just a many 
poor before and after the implementation of the programme, but that the income difference 
between the poor and the non-poor is reduced)
18.  
 
Table 7 estimates the changes in the poverty gaps for 3 countries due to means tested benefits.  
The reduction on the poverty gap is considerable in the three countries.  The largest reduction 
in absolute terms is again seen in the UK; the biggest relative change, however, is found in 
Sweden. This illustrates also the reasoning explained above. 
 
Table 9:  Average poverty gap and average poverty gap reduction by means-tested 
benefits for households who were poor before having received any means-tested 
transfers, United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden 
   Germany 1994  Sweden 1992 
United 
Kingdom 1991 
Absolute change of poverty gap  -0,537 -0,518  -0,586
    Rank order (small poverty gap = 1)  23  1
Relative change of poverty gap  -98% -152%  -121%
    Rank order (small poverty gap = 1)  31  2
Note:   The average poverty gap is calculated as the average resources needed to lift the poor households over 
the poverty line of 50% of median disposable household income after means-tested transfers adjusted for family 
size, given as a percentage of the poverty line. Poverty gaps are negative if the average income of the poor after 
transfers is higher than the poverty line. 
Source: C. Behrendt (2000a) 
 
 
The targeting of social assistance
19 in each of these three countries can be seen in table 8, 
where the distribution of households receiving means-tested benefits is given for different 
poverty brackets.  The results are striking and point towards very low level of coverage in 
Germany and Sweden.  For example, of the household in extreme poverty, 87% of them 
receive means-tested benefit in the UK, against 66% in Germany and almost half in Sweden.  
For Germany, the targeting efficiency drops even more when looking at strong and moderate 
poverty where about 1/3 of these household receive Social Assistance benefits.  In Sweden, 
the situation is slightly better at 50% to 70%, but does show signs of poor targeting when 
looking at the households who are not considered poor.  Indeed, 16% of these households do 
receive social assistance benefits while in the UK this figure is at 11% and in Germany at 4%.  
                                                 
18  Using a relative poverty measure complicates the estimates further since the threshold value of poverty is than 
distribution-dependent and thus influenced by the policy instrument used.  
19  Social Assistance is also indicated in this publication as targeted social transfers. This implies that the 
beneficiaries are defined by assessing their means: this process is indicated as targeting: in case means tested 
targeting.  
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Table 10:  Distribution of means-tested benefits on households (percentage of 
households receiving means-tested benefits in each poverty bracket), United Kingdom, 
Germany and Sweden. 
Poverty Bracket     Germany 1994 Sweden 1992 United Kingdom 1991
Extreme Poverty  Y < 30%  66 55 87
Strong Poverty  30% < Y < 40%  34 49 76
Moderate Poverty  40% < Y < 50%  28 69 76
Near Poverty  50% < Y < 60%  24 64 57
No Poverty  Y > 60%  4 16 11
Notes:  Y = disposable income adjusted for household size  
Example: Among all households living in extreme poverty before means-tested in Germany 1994, 66% 
received some kind of means-tested transfers 
Source:  C. Behrendt (2000a) 
 
 
The social assistance scheme in the United Kingdom has the most impact on poverty for those 
found in the extreme poverty and the strong poverty bracket, as shown in table 9.  The 
targeting effectiveness is very poor when looking at household in strong, moderate and near 
poverty.  This explains why poverty after receiving the benefit is actually increased in these 
three categories, but extensively decreased in the Extreme Poverty category.  Sweden is the 
only of the three countries where poverty is decreased in all four categories.  Indeed, poverty 
is also increased in the United Kingdom for those in the category Near Poverty by about 44%. 
 
Table 11:  Poverty rates before and after means-tested benefits and reduction through 
means-tested benefits, United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden. 
Poverty     Germany 1994 Sweden 1992 
United Kingdom 
1991
Impact of means-tested benefits in relative terms (percent) 
Extreme Poverty  Y < 30%  -49,1 -45,6  -80,6
Strong Poverty  30% < Y < 40%  10,0 -17,4  -40,0
Moderate Poverty  40% < Y < 50%  2,5 -52,2  -15,9
Near Poverty  50% < Y < 60%  15,4 -28,9  44,1
50% poverty (cummul.)  Y < 50%  -20,9 -44,3  -48,4
Notes:    Y = disposable income adjusted for household size 
Example: For the United Kingdom 1991, 9.3% of the population was extremely poor before having 
received some kind of transfers and 1.8% after having received some transfers. Poverty rates for this 
poverty bracket were thus reduced by 7.5 percentage points or by 80.6% compared to the pre-transfer 
poverty rates 
Source:  C. Behrendt (2000a) 
 
 
Social assistance programmes in Europe and the dependency trap 
Social Protection systems are set up to assist households to cope with difficult circumstances. 
Ideally, they should lift households out of poverty by providing benefits and services and 
bring them to the point where they no longer have to rely on the social protection system to 
survive. If a social protection system keeps people relatively long in the benefit system, we 
speak of benefit- or better welfare-dependency.  The latter is potentially a problem not only to 
the long run financing of the system, but also for the beneficiaries involved. Benefit  
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dependency usually keeps households on a low level of welfare and threatens their long term 
integration into society.  This is related to the problem of social exclusion. 
 
Giving the extensive experiences of modern Western welfare states, we know that some 
degree of welfare dependency is probably unavoidable, but that does not mean that the 
effectiveness of social assistance programmes (and social protection systems) should not be 
judged by the degree by which they avoid problems of welfare- and benefit-dependency. 
Benefit duration and recurrent entry into the systems are good indicators in this respect. Again 
data on this issue are limited but a couple of firm observations can be made. 
 
Using the data for selected cities in Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK in 
table 10, it can be concluded that benefit duration is very high in most countries: more than 80 
% of the beneficiaries receive a SA benefit for over 12 months in Spain and the UK; the 
lowest figure is found for Sweden where still more than one third of the beneficiaries stay in 
the system for more than 12 months
20.  The social assistance systems do not seem very 
effective in sending people back to the labour market or the regular economy. According to 
the data collected by Saraceno (2002), a significant amount of persons re-enter social 
assistance several times.  For a serious number of recipients it is clearly true that they do not 
succeed in permanently leaving the system.  This raises questions about the possibility to 
“activate” these persons, or at least questions about the actual success of the systems in 
realising that.  We will discuss this issue again in the next section on social assistance 
reforms. 
 
Table 12:  Long Term duration of Social Assistance benefits  
  Percentage  of  total  beneficiaries 
  12 months or more  Between 
12 and 24 months 
24 months or more 
Germany 38.3  18.0  20.3 
Italy   43.9  19.2  24.7 
Portugal 75.3  17.2  58.0 
Spain 80.3  19.3  61.0 
Sweden 33.6  19.3  14.3 
UK 83.0  13.9  69.1 
Sources:  Saraceno 2002, UK: Gassmann and Deszka, 2003 Data for different  
  years between 1991 and 1994.. 
 
 
C.  Arrangements to contain administrative costs 
 
Financial arrangements vary greatly between the different countries studied.  In Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, the municipalities take an important role in both 
the financing and the administration of the Social Assistance system.  However, in France, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom, financing and most of the administration is predominantly 
a task of the national government.  Nevertheless, even in countries where the social assistance 
system is greatly decentralised, the municipalities do receive a part of the funding from the 
national level (Italy is an important exception in this respect). For example, in Belgium, 
municipalities receive a matching-grant for the value of at least 50% of the benefits they pay 
                                                 
20 The figures for Italy refer to Turin; given the very local organisation of social assistance in Italy, we find 
different figures for other cities usually due to a lack of elaboration of the SA system: Saraceno (2002) quotes 
the example of Milan. 
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out.  On the other hand, in Sweden and the Netherlands, the state provides block grant 
funding to municipalities for the range of functions they have to fulfil.  Also Dutch and 
Swedish municipalities must fund their social assistance expenditures partially from their own 
tax take, together with the state grant. 
 
All systems face the problem of containing the costs. In the design of the social assistance 
systems there are basically two types of instruments that can be used to do that:  
•  Institutional incentives between the legislators and sponsors on the one hand (usually 
the central government level) and the providers on the other hand (usually the local 
administrative level); 
•  Incentives and pressures on the beneficiaries to reduce the number of claims and to 
limit the duration of the claims. 
 
Institutional incentives may take the form of bureaucratic controls and more importantly of 
financing mechanisms that guarantee the co-responsibility of the local level (providers)
21. 
Partial (conditional) block grants and matching grants are used in most countries.  The 
Netherlands used to have a full capitation grant, guaranteeing the local level the ex post 
reimbursement of all costs made for social assistance.  This financing mechanism has shifted 
towards a block grant, but the effects of the former system are still visible in the form of 
relatively high spending levels for social assistance in the Netherlands.  
 
Pressure and incentives for the beneficiaries take many forms ranging from low replacement 
levels to earned income disregards and tax benefits; these instruments are discussed in the 
section 4. 
 
It is important to note that every national system seeks a certain balance in the design of the 
social assistance systems by using trade-offs between various instruments.  In general, 
systems with generous benefits (like the Swedish and the Dutch) seek to compensate for its 
generosity by installing though bureaucratic controls at the local level.  Systems with 
moderately generous benefit levels (like the Belgian and the French) try to contain the costs 
by heavy involvement of the social workers in “re-cycling” the beneficiaries into the regular 
economy or at least in the workfare sector.  Low benefit levels of the southern European type 
need less controls and tax instruments to contain the costs, but are less effective in terms of 
poverty alleviation.  In designing social assistance systems it seems crucial to search for a 
system that makes choices that fits the economy and the social “culture” in the county. 
 
All European systems are cost efficient judging the share of the administration costs.  This is 
remarkable since means testing and monitoring beneficiaries are usually costly operations.  
This is only possible because the caseload for the social assistance systems is contained by the 
fact that the majority of the cases where households or individuals become temporary poor are 
dealt with by the other parts of the Social Protection system encompassing both contributory 
and other non-contributory benefits.  The presence of large public good sectors in education, 
health, public transportation and housing that in fact distribute categorically targeted in kind 
benefits (to pupils and students and to the ill and handicapped), is a factor of importance in 




                                                 
21   For a discussion of institutional incentives see de Neubourg (2002).  
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D.  Implementation 
 
There is a huge degree of variation on how social assistance arrangements are actually 
implemented at the local level.  No internationally comparative studies are available allowing 
drawing conclusions in this respect.  The practice is so different that case studies are almost 
necessary to describe the daily operations (for an interesting set of case studies see Saraceno, 
2002, chapters 2 and 4).  The details of the implementation are, however, very important and 
may explain the success rate of social assistance programmes.  A successful example is the 
Belgian social assistance office wherein trained social workers combine moderate benefits 
(nowadays called “living wage”) with a plethora of instruments often using in kind support, 
labour market assistance and financial coaching.  
 
Outreach and information is not really an issue in Europe. Even in the most centralised 
systems, such as in the United Kingdom, social assistance offices are scattered all over the 
country to make sure that everyone can access them easily.  The fact that Europe is very 
densely populated together with the fact that the transportation infrastructure is well 
developed makes the outreach of the social assistance system in terms of physical access 
rather good.  In many countries, for example Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy, is the 
municipality the first point of information for all residents.  This implies that even if an 
individual does not know the precise details of how to apply for social assistance, he/she will 
most likely first go to his/her municipal office and thus hit the right door.  Nonetheless, some 
individuals do not end up finding the financial help they should receive because of lack of 
information.  Most vulnerable groups are immigrants who are less familiar with the social 
security system of their new country of residence, as well as the elderly who never used the 
social security system or for whom a change in the system has occurred after they left the 
labour market.  
 
In most of the countries, claimants have to apply personally for their benefits.  The required 
forms are then filled out together with the social worker or case manager.  In France and 
Germany, the procedure starts with a written application. All countries employ income tests to 
evaluate whether a claimant is eligible to receive benefits and in Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands these details and other personal information are always verified. In Germany, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom verification only takes place when there is suspicion that a 
wrong detail or information has been given.  The role of the case manager handling the 
specific application procedure is limited in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom.  The case manager guides the applicant in the procedure but the decision with 
respect to receipt of benefits is left to another unit.  This method might be chosen to preserve 
the objectivity.  However, in Germany and Sweden, the case managers are given more 
discretional power and guide the applicants but also decide about whether or not benefits are 
awarded. 
 
Three different difficulties are associated with the implementation of social assistance 
systems.  Firstly, there is the problem of controlling the conditions that make one eligible to 
receive benefits.  Secondly, economic disincentives are considered to be a great difficulty in 
the implementation.  These disincentives include poverty traps, especially relevant for those 
that only become slightly worse off when leaving the labour market.  The third problem is 
related to take-up, which is discussed in section 2, showing that not all legally eligible 




4.  Reforms in European Social Safety Nets 
 
Social Protection systems often figure on the policy agenda.  This has been increasingly the 
case since the economic downturns of the eighties and the nineties of the last century. Issues 
have been raised about the long term financial sustainability of the systems as a whole 
referring to changing demographics (ageing and the inflow of new immigrants) and changing 
economics (globalisation and a consequentially eroding tax base).  Moreover, some analysts 
believe that the current Social Protection systems installed incentives that lead to more moral 
hazard and thus to abuse, in turn resulting in an increased caseload for the SP systems.  
 
All these forces have pushed policy makers across the OECD area to reform the social 
protection system in general and the social assistance arrangements in particular. This section 
reviews the changes proposed for: 
A.  Incentives for the beneficiaries 
B.  The incentives for the provides and  
C.  The entitlement rights. 
 
The need for reform 
 
Reforms of the Welfare State are mainly in response to changing situations. Policy makers are 
forced to evaluate existing policy and to consider alternatives because of an immediate 
problem that may lead to a political crisis.  Over the last decades it has frequently been argued 
that European social protection systems would be or become unsustainable due to 
demographic and economic changes. Notably the unprecedented high number of long-term 
unemployed (and/or people permanently at the margin of the labour force), the ageing of the 
population and the inflow of more immigrants would have put the SP system under pressure 
and would have endangered its long term financing.  The same is said about the globalisation 
trend in the world economy that is assumed to contribute to an eroding tax base.  While there 
were few countries that really faced fiscal crises due to the SP system, the mechanisms 
pushing the reforms are, however, somewhat more subtle and political.  The attitudes of tax 
payers have been changing in the sense that an increasing number of the population became 
reluctant to pay for social transfers (solidarity) to a segment of the population that seems to 
have been stimulated by the generous benefit system to settle at the margin of the economic 
system.  What was defined as “welfare dependency” for the recipients became seen “welfare 
cocooning” to those contributing to the system (moral hazard), thus reducing the willingness 
to pay for the SP system.  Despite the fact that the empirical evidence invariably points to the 
fact that welfare dependency is a marginal problem, the anecdotic evidence about a -
nevertheless present- minority, has changed the attitudes and the opinions of taxpayers. It is 
undeniably true that the political discourse on Social Protection system has changed pressing 
towards less solidarity and a diminished preparedness to share the costs (taxes, premiums).  
On the more conservative end of the political spectrum the pressure has been towards more 
individual responsibility and less collective public assistance; on the more progressive end of 
the political spectrum arguments have been formulated to fight marginalisation (social 
exclusion) of welfare recipients by stimulating social inclusion. In both cases it pushes 
towards activation of the beneficiaries of SP systems. 
 
It is also true that social protection systems are far from perfect and that there is ample room 
for improvements in the systems (see also de Neubourg and Castonguay, 2006).  It is, 
however, remarkable how stable the Welfare States have been in Europe.  The large re-
distributive machinery still exists, despite the fact that numerous operational details have been  
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changing over time.  The quintessence of the systems has not been changed; while some 
changes have been important, a large number of them were only cosmetic.  
 
A political crisis is not a sufficient condition for policy change.  The capacity to translate a 
crisis into specific policy innovation depends on political forces and institutional factors. 
Indeed, reforms are often only slowly implemented and limited in scope even because of: 
•  Stickiness: Resistance to change because of the existence of formal and informal veto 
points and path dependency. 
•  Ingrained popular expectations and the electoral popularity of the Welfare State. 
•  Institutionalised contract:  The Welfare State as we know it has been one of the chief 
organising principles of the lives of several generations and hence it represents a 
deeply institutionalised contract. 
 
Consequently a crisis might trigger the need for reform, but the reform itself is often slowed 
down because of political forces and institutional factors.  It is a combination of globalisation 
and long-lasting and slow social changes that put new demands on the “old” Welfare States: 
•  Changes in economic and social conditions in Western societies in the last quarter of 
the 20
th century; 
•  Changes in the demographic situation and the appearance of new groups; 
•  Changes in the “discours politique” in many Western societies. 
 
Objectives and instruments 
 
Basically Social Protection arrangements are under pressure because they either exhaust fiscal 
resources or because they are believed to produce adverse results (often a combination of 
both). The main objective of welfare reforms is to reduce the public expenditure of an 
arrangement by reducing the number of benefit months and their related administrative costs.  
The instruments that are used to realise this overall objective are to be subdivided in 2 
categories: 
•  Reducing the quantity and the duration of benefits 
o  to provide incentives for potential claimants to apply less often for an 
arrangement; 
o  to provide incentives for beneficiaries/clients/recipients to stay shorter periods (to 
exit the arrangements as soon as possible); 
o  to provide incentives to the providers to reduce the participation rate (ratio of 
accepted claimants to legally entitled claimants); 
o  to provide incentives to the providers to reduce the actual duration of benefits by 
stimulating the beneficiaries to stay shorter periods; 
o  to cut the number of potential applicants by changing legal entitlement rules; 
•  Reducing operational costs; 
o  administrative and market reforms intended to increase productivity in case-load 
handling, to reduce overhead costs and to work more efficient. 
 
A.  Reforming incentives for the beneficiaries 
 
Apart from the apparent goal of reducing the financial burden of the welfare provisions and 
the wish to reduce the aggregate dependency rate by increasing the number of contributors, 
the underlying reason for changes in social assistance arrangements has been an increased 
concern about the ‘social inclusion’ of welfare recipients via increased- and speeded-up 
integration into the labour market.  To implement these policy reforms many forms of  
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incentives directed towards the (potential) beneficiaries of the Social Protection systems are 
used.  We distinguish below between: 
•  Financial incentives;  
•  Increased administrative and moral pressure; 
•  Lower barriers to entry the labour market; 
•  Enhancing self-responsibility in covering risks and making choices. 
 
Financial incentives 
In this category five instruments are used by many countries: 
  
Higher earnings disregards 
Under many Social Protection arrangements beneficiaries loose their benefit (and 
often other related benefits and subsidies - housing subsidies in many cases) once they 
start working and thus pass an income threshold.  This creates poverty- or 
dependency-traps. In order to avoid this apparent disincentive to accept jobs, many 
countries have chosen to smooth the transition into to the labour market by introducing 
or extending higher earnings disregard when a job is accepted. 
  A higher earnings disregard refers to an increase in the portion of the wage not 
deducted from a claimant’s benefit.  It should lead to a financial stimulation for the 
benefit recipient to return back to the labour market as the beneficiary receives the 
opportunity to earn extra money next to receiving a benefit.    
Increased earned income tax credit 
This is a special tax credit for low-income people who meet certain requirements and 
file a tax return.  The basic idea is simple: persons previously in a social protection 
arrangement accepting a job are given a special income tax relief either for a specified 
period. Some countries have introduced this additional tax relief for all workers 
(regardless of whether they have been in a Social Protection arrangement or not) 
intending to increase financial incentives to accept a job or stay on their job. 
Back to work bonus 
This cash benefit is given to Social Protection beneficiaries when taking up 
employment or when moving from part-time to full-time work.  In some cases the 
benefit is paid as a one-time bonus, in others it is spread over the first years of 
employment. 
Stimulating self-employment  
Another option for an unemployed to return to the labour market is through self-
employment.  An incentive is offered for unemployed to become self-employed 
through special programmes. 
Increasing child care allowances 
Since a substantial number of beneficiaries are single parents (mostly mothers) many 
countries increased child care allowances for persons accepting a job.  This reduces 
the poverty trap that exists for single parents to find a low wage job who would see 
their disposal income declining because the eventual gain of a higher wage compared 
to the social benefit is more than compensated by the additional costs for child care. 
 
Table 11 summarises which of the EU countries (Europe 15) used which instruments since 
1997.  It can be seen that earned tax income credit and increasing child care allowances are 
the most popular instruments used. 
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Table 13:  The use of financial incentives for beneficiaries in Europe after 1997 














Austria   X     X 
Belgium  X X      X 
Denmark  X X    X  X 
Germany   X   X X 
Greece     X    
Finland   X     X 
France  X X X    X 
Ireland     X  X  
Italy   X      
Luxemburg   X      
Netherlands  X X X  X  X 
Portugal         
Spain     X  X 
Sweden   X      
UK   X  X    X 
Sources: compiled from Peters et al. (2004) and from de Neubourg, and Nelissen (2007) 
 
 
Increased administrative pressure on the beneficiaries to accept a job 
Apart from providing incentives for beneficiaries of Social Protection systems to return to the 
labour market by increasing the returns of paid labour (compared to the benefits) or by 
reducing the costs (child care), Social Protection administrations also use administrative 
pressure to push beneficiaries to the labour market. In most countries this comes in three main 
forms: workfare, stricter requirements and sanctions and improved personal services. 
 
Workfare 
“Workfare” covers many different programmes that focus primarily on work.  The 
main difference between workfare and active labour market policies is the fact that 
workfare comprises the idea that you need to work-for-your-welfare.  Its 
implementation is harsher than that by the combination of: 
•  Work-orientation: “any job is a good job”; 
•  Compulsion: requirements and sanctions; 
•  Focus on the lowest tier of public income maintenance (often groups with the 
furthest distance from the labour market); 
•  Lack of focus on training elements and options. 
Most European countries introduced in some way or another a workfare approach, but 
the set up differ considerably per country.  Some countries are very strict in setting 
exact requirements, while other countries adjust the rules in order to avoid that too 
much clients fall out of the system.  Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom are examples of European countries that implemented a fairly strict 
“workfare approach”.  
 
Stricter requirements and sanctions 
The requirements to be eligible for a benefit (social assistance, unemployment benefit, 
but also other benefits) are becoming increasingly more stringent and sanctions are 
gradually more implemented.  These requirement and sanctions are mostly imbedded 
in a “workfare” setting as the focus is put on actively finding work and/or participating 
in work experience programmes or trainings. In addition, the job search requirement is 
becoming stricter in the sense that unemployed should apply to all (legally accepted) 





To move beneficiaries as quickly as possible out of the benefit system, the focus 
moved towards more individualised assistance.  Different systems of individualised 
assistance co-exist.  In many cases, beneficiaries get assigned to a specific case 
manager or personal advisor who helps not only to fill out all the benefit forms, but 
often also helps the client to formulate an individual action plan focused on becoming 
self-sufficient. Examples of these action plans are the integration contract in Germany, 
the New Deal in the UK, the municipal workfare programmes in the Netherlands and 
“Plan d’Insertion” in France. 
 
Lower barriers to entry the labour market 
The success of a workfare programme is dependent on the existence of good quality job 
placements.  Consequently, stimulating the demand side is equally important as activating the 
supply side.  Most workfare programmes are therefore combined with either a lowering of the 
employers’ social contributions or with employer subsidies.  
 
Enhancing self responsibility 
Shifts to cash benefits for special groups 
Increasingly, the focus is shifting towards cash benefits instead of benefits in kind. 
 
Saving accounts 
The issue of introducing the system of saving accounts in the social security system is 
still very hotly debated in European countries.  The controversy is caused by the fact 
that under certain types of implementation, each person individually saves on his/her 
saving account, leading to a more unequal system, which might harm people who 
suffer unexpected risks.  The basic design of the system of personal saving accounts is 
that mandatory payments into a personal savings account will replace taxes currently 
used to finance unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, parental leave and pensions. 
When there is need, people can withdraw from their account instead of receiving 
benefits. 
 
B.  Reforming incentives for the providers 
 
Besides changing the regulations and incentives for the beneficiaries, policy makers who seek 
to reduce the number of benefit months may also change the organisation of the Social 
Protection administration itself. It is believed that providing the right incentives for the 
providers of the assistance may lead to a reduction in the caseload and the costs. Three main 
trends can be observed when looking at European countries: devolution, privatisation and the 




Decentralisation is currently publicly debated and is motivated as it leads to greater 
flexibility, efficiency or resources and more integrated contact with other local actors 
(public/private cooperation).  In many European countries this trend has been 




                                                 
22 Details on the implementation of these trends differ across countries and the discussion of the main differences 
is found in de Neubourg and Nelissen 2007.  
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Privatisation 
Privatisation can be seen as a shift from government responsibility to the individual 
and the market. In the Netherlands the complete privatisation of the reintegration 
services took 8 years (from 1994 to 2002) through trial and error. 
 
Increased service quality 
One-stop shop can lead to more cost-efficiency and greater co-ordination as multiple 
interrelated services are brought together under one roof.  The clients are provided 
with one single point of contact for (almost all) their claims.  This leads to more 
transparency and client satisfaction.  E-governance or services online is increasingly 
implemented to cope with cost minimising problems, to enhance information access 
and to increase service quality. 
 
C.  Reforming entitlement rights 
 
Finally a reduction of the number of benefit months can be realised just by making it more 
difficult to enter the system: excluding certain groups or limiting the rights of others are 
options chosen. 
 
Despite the universalistic tendency in many European Welfare States, differences in 
entitlements regarding the Social Protection support are still presents and growing.  These 
differences are produced ‘at the margin’ rather than in the heart of the system and basically 
the debates concentrate around 2 groups: the young and the immigrant population.  In case of 
the young, decisions have to be made on when a young person can be entitled to receive 
support.  Two elements are important in this context: the solidarity of kinship and family and 
the fact that young people did not work for a long period and therefore did not contribute to 
the Social Protection system.  The immigrant population in Europe has been growing and do 
need disproportional assistance from the Social Protection system.  The system has been 
under pressure to abandon the rights of the immigrant population to Social Protection 
coverage or to reformulate their rights (e.g. excluding them from cash benefits and restricting 
them to benefits in kind provided in specific locations). 
 
A limited success 
 
The important concluding question is whether the policy changes brought the effects that 
were intended. There is not a lot of research available to lead to clear-cut conclusions and the 
impact studies that are available come with different conclusions, but the overall trend seems 
to be that the results of the policy changes in Europe are rather disappointing.  This is due to 
three basic reasons. 
 
First, the wish to activate the social assistance beneficiaries and to “recycle” them into the 
regular economy provides the administrations with serious incentives to activate the welfare 
recipients with the highest chances of being employed; as a result the remaining beneficiaries 
are those that are hard to activate into the regular labour market.  The reforms therefore 
change the distribution rather than the quantity of the beneficiaries.  This raises an interesting 
issue pointing to the fact that there may be two kinds of welfare recipients: those who are easy 
to activate and those who are not.  The former group is not long-term vulnerable but is easily 
recycled both by the economy and the Social Protection system (and so can and will be 
activated easily).  The latter group is difficult to integrate into the regular labour market at 
current minimum- and market wages: their perceived productivity is too low to justify  
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employment at current wages.  As a result they tend to stay within the Social Protection 
system when the system allows them to.  
 
The Social Protection system can now react basically in two ways: it either recognises this 
fact and allows the beneficiaries to keep on receiving benefits or they ‘sanction’ (by 
regulation or by discretion) the recipients and stop the benefit. Under the latter regime the 
costs for the beneficiaries are in fact shifted to other sources of assistance (either to families, 
to networks, to third sector charity or to the informal unregulated low-wage low-productivity 
labour market).  Under the former regime (staying as a beneficiary) people can either just 
keep their benefit or people can be stimulated to integrate into a particular segment of the 
labour market and be “included” in the society.  The Belgian system institutionalised the latter 
possibility by giving long term beneficiaries the opportunity to work in the low productivity 
service sector paid by relatively small contributions from the buyers of the services while the 
recipients can supplement their benefit with a relatively modest increase in their income with 
the public sector filling the gap.  The system works well, stimulating social inclusion of 
benefit recipients without forcing them into a labour market where they would not be able to 
survive. Moreover, they often provide services in the economy that would be left undone or 
would be provided by voluntary workers or on informal markets; 
 
The second reason why reforms did often not produced the intended effect is that providers 
(and politicians) looking for immediate success tend to focus on the statement that ‘every job 
is better than no job’, stimulating beneficiaries to accept precarious employment.  While 
leading to immediate success in terms of individuals leaving the ranks of the unemployed, it 
also might be the recipe to become soon a welfare recipient again.  This may lead to exactly 
the opposite effect of what has been intended: namely to long-term vulnerability because the 
recipient is further stigmatized by repeated welfare dependency.  The mechanism is known as 
the “revolving door” and has been observed in Denmark, Sweden and Germany (Saraceno, 
2002; Abrahamson, 2000; see also Atkinson, 1998 and Paugam, 1997). 
 
Finally, beneficiaries pushed out of the Social Protection system and nevertheless not being 
able to find stable employment, may find themselves in a situation wherein they have no other 
choice than to settle in “assisted equilibrium” relying on the Social Protection system 
whenever allowed and seeking informal (and precarious) employment to supplement their 
income. 
 
5.  Lessons from Europe 
 
This concluding section summarises the main findings of the analysis and draws lessons from 
the European experiences. While copying European means-tested social assistance 
programmes is not a viable path for other countries, an improved and locally adjusted version 
of the European social protection architecture, including a social assistance scheme as 
instrument of last resort, is an interesting option with the potential of gradually bringing low 
poverty and inequality levels within reach. 
 
The main findings revisited 
 
The findings of the previous sections (and of underlying studies referred to footnote 1) can be 
summarised in the following points: 
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•  European countries spend a big share of their GDP on Social Protection. The 
European Social Protection systems are effective and efficient.  Moreover, they play a 
crucial role in reducing both poverty and inequality. 
•  Within the Social Protection systems means tested social assistance programmes play 
a modest role in most European countries; social assistance can rather be seen as 
instrument of last resort.  The extent by which poverty is reduced by the social 
assistance system is co-determined by its place in the entire Social Protection system. 
•  The percentage of the population actually receiving social assistance is therefore low 
in most countries (but increasing).  Yet, the performance and specific features of these 
schemes differ over countries.  They especially differ with respect to the solidarity 
basis, generosity and selectivity and targeting.  
•  The UK is most effective in reducing headcount poverty by the social assistance 
system, but still faces the highest poverty rate in northern Europe. 
•  European social assistance systems can be grouped in three main groups: supportive 
systems (in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden), selective 
systems (in Italy, Portugal and Spain) and inclusive systems (UK). 
•  Potential beneficiaries go through a filtering process that greatly determines the 
success (or lack thereof) of a programme.  Overall, social assistance systems target the 
poor very well. Nevertheless still a significant number of benefits are allocated 
towards the people (just) above the poverty line. 
•  The non-take up rate is considerable in many European countries and is therefore an 
important policy issue. 
•  Recent socio-economic developments have pressed many countries to reform their 
social assistance system. Reforms are meant to reduce either the quantity and duration 
of the benefits or the operational costs by means of providing the right incentives to 
both the beneficiaries and providers.  The success of the reform policies and especially 
of activation policies has been limited, mainly due to the existence of a hard core of 
social assistance recipients. 
 
Lessons for other countries 
 
Lesson 1: Building up the Social Protection system 
Copying the European type of social assistance to other countries will not lead to a successful 
and pronounced decline in poverty and inequality.  European social assistance systems are 
part of a larger social protection construct. Copying one element out of that construct will not 
yield European like poverty- and inequality levels.  However, it does make sense to try to 
copy the design and architecture of the (whole) European Social Protection system.   
Improvements should then be considered (see lessons 4 and 5) and the systems should be 
locally adjusted.  The idea is that Social Protection policy is a matter of design (besides sound 
and transparent implementation). The mature stage of a Social Protection system should be 
the starting point of the design exercise.  
 
The European Social Protection systems are all built up gradually during more than a century.  
The systems for a long time were based on the typical continental European conditions from 
around the early fifties of the last century: households characterised by nuclear families with 
few children with a male worker working in the formal non-agricultural sector.  The system 
had to adjust and still is adapting to smaller families, a high divorce rate with lone-parents a 
significant element and more economic instability with larger spells of unemployment. 
Designing new systems for other countries also means to decide how to take local economic, 
demographic and social conditions into consideration.  It is wise and (technically) possible to  
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seek solutions that are relatively robust against the changes referred to. Institutional 
developments play a serious role in what is possible and impossible. 
 
Lesson 2: Institutional design 
All systems will have to solve the problem of containing costs. Institutional design is an 
important element in this respect and the financial relations between sponsors and providers 
are of crucial importance. Incentives and administrative procedures towards the beneficiaries 
are the other important element. Some countries combine a high level of generosity in 
benefits with though administrative procedures to apply; other have less stringent rules but 
provide also less generous benefits.  All systems will have to balance the regulations and 
incentives in order to reach the objectives set on the one hand but contain the costs on the 
other. 
 
Lesson 3: Implementation 
Besides design, implementation is important.  European systems all are characterised by a 
high density of regional social assistance offices operating in relative urbanised densely 
populated areas.  The offices are well-equipped and employing well-trained staff with 
considerable discretionary power. The social workers dispose of an extended portfolio of non-
cash benefits and assistance. 
 
The success of the European social assistance systems is partially due to the fact that they 
have a reduced caseload since many persons are caught in the safety net before they fall into 
the ultimate net of social assistance and partially due to the fact that operate in the proximity 
of the recipients and dispose of a large spectrum of instruments.  The proximity of the social 
assistance offices reduces the outreach problem, facilitates control over the applicants and 
enhances the personal character of the services towards the recipients.  
 
In adjusting the implementation of the basic scheme three important requirements should be 
taken into consideration: 
•  Capacity to pay: Is the country able to afford the specific implementation of the 
component given its level of economic development? 
•  Capacity to implement: Is the legal and institutional infrastructure in the country 
capable of implementing a component; does the country have enough trained capacity 
to implement the policy? 
•  Capacity to design: Does the country have enough human capital to design the details 
of all the components? 
It should be noted that while the first two capacities are difficult to develop, the latter capacity 
is the easiest one to be build: only a few people are needed for that part and that is where 
training should start. 
 
Lesson 4: Further development and the setting of priorities 
Having to make choices on the priorities in the development of a social protection system, 
four elements in the life course design stand out as basic and should be addressed first: 
•  Child allowances.  
The European countries (except Greece) all have universal child allowances and 
educational allowances of some sort. It is proved to be a crucial element in alleviating 
poverty for one of the most vulnerable groups in the economy in all countries, namely 
households with children.  Invariably middle- and low-income countries (and some 
advanced countries like the USA) show that child poverty is high. Child allowances  
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are a powerful instrument in combating poverty.  Child allowances are non-
contributory. 
•  Flat rate basic old age pensions.  
Although the elderly population seems to be the best protected subgroup in many 
countries, the provision of an universal flat pension still may be a interesting element 
in reducing poverty, mainly because it takes the elderly as a group out of policy 
makers concern regarding poverty especially when supplemented by a well designed 
compulsory second pillar in the contributed pension system.  Moreover, pensions are 
often passed on to grandchildren especially in countries where extended families are 
still prevalent.  Flat rate basic pensions are non-contributory 
•  Income Loss Insurance.  
The economically active part of population needs relatively less protection but needs 
an insurance type of regulation to protect them against all type of (labor) income loss. 
In de developed European Welfare States there are several insurances covering each 
another type of risk.  The social insurances protect the population ate working age 
effectively against adverse economic conditions such as unemployment, labor related 
disability and short term illness.  All income loss insurances are contributory (and 
compulsory). 
•  Social assistance.  
Means tested social assistance plays the role of instrument of last resort and should be 
well designed to avoid “over-consumption”, to maximise take up rates and to prevent 
welfare dependency for those groups for which it is realistic to expect re-entry in the 
labour market (see sections 3 and 4).  The recently revised Belgian system probably 
provides the best overall design combining medium level benefits with well guided in 
kind supplements and strong but realistic activation measures. 
 
However, many policy makers in middle- and low-income countries will argue that budget 
constraints do not allow them to introduce a comprehensive system like the European one. 
This is true if the system would be introduced at once and with benefit levels comparable to 
the European ones.  However, it is possible to install the system gradually using (very) low 
benefit levels and thus limiting the budgets needed for its implementation.  As the economy 
grows the system can then be made more generous at the speed of economic growth. It avoids 
installing elements of a system that has to be revised and redesigned regularly.  The overall 
design is then at least known and further implementation is “only” a matter of expanding the 
system.  It is true that the system is endangered and difficult to implement if the economy has 
a large informal sector.  This applies, however, to nearly all Social Protection arrangements. 
A policy to “formalise” the economy is necessary. 
 
Lastly, it is important to note that “social engineering” in Social Protection systems is difficult 
since vision is to be paired by intelligent and detailed policy design.  Politicians, interest 
groups and providers are often guided by relatively short-term motives and are limited in their 
choice by vested interests and veto-points.  But policy advisors and analysts can point to the 
gains to be made and a well elaborated design can also help in convincing the stakeholders 
that improvements are feasible and potentially successful.  After all, Social Protection systems 
are intended to render the world more human, but it is also shaped by human actions and 
behaviour, for the better and the worse.  
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